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THE SOPHISTICATES: CONFLICTED REPRESENTATION
AND THE LEHMAN BANKRUPTCY
Milan Markovic*
INTRODUCTION
One of the early lessons of the recent financial crisis is the degree to which
conflicts of interest pervade the financial system. Employees of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States (Federal Reserve), and other government agencies were tasked with
monitoring financial institutions that formerly employed them,' investment banks
stood to profit if certain financial products they marketed were to fail, 2 and
purportedly neutral ratings agencies overestimated the soundness of mortgage-
backed securities so as to avoid losing business.'
This Article contends that attorney conflicts of interest also played an
underappreciated role in the financial crisis. The well-known New York law firm
of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Sullivan) represented, inter alia, Bear, Steams & Co.
* 0 2012 Milan Markovic. Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University
School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (2006); M.A., New York
University (2003); B.A. Columbia University (2001). In addition to my colleagues at Texas
Wesleyan, I would like to thank Richard Greenstein, David Hoffman, Eleanor Myers,
Harwell Wells, and Jennifer Herbst for their valuable suggestions during the writing of this
article. Sophia Duffy and Denene Wambach provided exemplary research assistance. For
purposes of full disclosure, I represented Lehman Brothers in connection with the
bankruptcy of Sentinel Management Group while in private practice with Sidley Austin
LLP.
'See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from 'Government Sachs,' N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at BU 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/
19gold.html?pagewanted=all& r-0; Stephen Foley, How Goldman Sachs Took Over the
World, INDEPENDENT (July 22, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/
analysis-and-features/how-goldman-sachs-took-over-the-world-873869.html.
2 Goldman Sachs recently reached a settlement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for $550 million in connection with allegations that it sold a subprime
mortgage investment that was designed to fail. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goldman Sachs to
Pay Record Settlement in Fraud Suit, Change Business Practices, WASH. POST (July 16,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/15/AR201007150
5111.html. J.P. Morgan Chase settled a similar case for $153.6 million. Marcy Gordon, JP.
Morgan to Settle Fraud Case, Bos. GLOBE (June 22, 2011), http://www.boston.com/
business/articles/2011/06/22/jpmorganto settle fraudcase/.
See John C. Coffee Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 403, 409-11 (2009); see also Claire A. Hill, Why Did Ratings Agencies Do
Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 585, 586 (2010)
(suggesting conflicts of interest were partly responsible for poor performance of credit




(Bear), Lehman Brothers (Lehman), American Insurance Group (AIG), Goldman
Sachs & Co. (Goldman), and Barclays PLC (Barclays) in the aftermath of the real
estate market's crash.4 This Article uses Sullivan's representation of Lehman as a
case study to demonstrate that conflicts of interest can prevent an attorney or law
firm from acting in a client's best interests even if the representation is in
accordance with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the
client is a sophisticated corporation like Lehman.
Scholars have largely assumed that only unsophisticated clients can be
harmed by an attorney's conflicts of interest.s This notion is also reflected in the
Model Rules, which explain, "Experienced user[s] of legal services" can provide
"general and open-ended" consent to attorney conflicts.6 This Article contends that
all clients, regardless of their level of sophistication, may have difficulty assessing
the significance of an attorney's conflicts. Under the Model Rules, an attorney can
generally continue with a conflicted representation if the client consents to the
4 Jessica Centers, "Who Did You Rep During the Financial Crisis, Daddy?," N.Y.
SUPER LAW. (Sept. 2009), http://Www.superlawyers.com/new-york-metro/article/Who-Did-
You-Rep-During-the-Global-Financial-Meltdown-Daddy/ce95d239-a5 le-42c3-9d74-
a0d35291ed77.html; Ben Hallman, No Precedent, AM. LAW., Apr. 2009, at 76, 76-78; see
also ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL 379 (discussing lawyers at Sullivan
switching from representing Lehman to representing Barclays).
5 See, e.g., Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5
GEO. J. L. ETHICS, 823, 873 (1992) ("Another interesting and important question
unanswered by current doctrine is whether the same boundary for nonconsentable conflicts
should be set for all clients. One could argue, for example, for more relaxed or even no
limits on the range of choice regarding risk preference for clients who have considerable
ability to assess and monitor risk."); Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal
Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 173, 200-01 (2008) [hereinafter Zacharias, Effects of
Reputation] (suggesting that lawyers for sophisticated clients will adhere to conflict of
interest rules for reputational reasons). This issue has also been recently debated in the Yale
Law Journal Online. See James W. Jones & Anthony E. Davis, In Defense of a Reasoned
Dialogue About Law Firms and Their Sophisticated Clients, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 589,
589-92 (2012), http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/1064.pdf (suggesting, on behalf of
the general counsel of thirty-three prominent law firms, that sophisticated clients and their
lawyers should be able to decide how conflict of interest rules should apply in their
relationships). But see Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball
to Client Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 567, 571-73 (2012), http://yalelawjoumal.org/
images/pdfs/1063.pdf (arguing proposed modifications to conflict of interest rules by
thirty-three of the nation's largest law firms would undermine lawyers' loyalty to their
clients).
6 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2009); see also N.Y. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2011) ("[G]eneral and open-ended waivers by
experienced users of legal services may be effective."). Although the comment to MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 does not define the term "experienced users of legal
services," the key elements seem to be whether the client has experience in similar
representations and is informed of the risks involved when, for example, being represented
by independent counsel to determine whether to waive the conflict of interest. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22.
[No. 2904
2012] CONFLICTED REPRESENTATION AND THE LEHMAN BANKRUPTCY
conflicted representation and the attorney reasonably believes he can provide
"competent and diligent representation."' Instead, attorneys should be required to
consider whether conflicts of interest may interfere with their ability to act in the
best interests of their clients and achieve their clients' objectives.
Sullivan undoubtedly endeavored to represent Lehman to the best of its ability,
and the purpose of this Article is not to determine whether Sullivan violated
professional standards with regard to attorney conflicts of interest. Indeed, this
Article assumes that, consistent with the Model Rules, Sullivan disclosed its
conflicts of interest and Lehman gave "informed consent" for the representation to
proceed.9 It is, of course, impossible to know all of the particulars of Sullivan's
representation of Lehman,'( but this Article nevertheless suggests that, based on
information that has been made publicly available, there is strong reason to believe
that Sullivan's preexisting relationships with other clients, as well as Sullivan's
interest in preserving its reputation with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury,
undermined the representation that it could provide to Lehman.
Part I of this Article briefly sets out the events immediately leading to the
Lehman bankruptcy and Sullivan's role in representing Lehman. Part II draws on
existing scholarship to analyze the effectiveness of Model Rule 1.7 (Rule 1.7), the
chief provision concerning attorneys' concurrent conflicts of interest. Part III,
which comprises the majority of the Article, identifies three conflicts of interest
that may have interfered with Sullivan's representation of Lehman. Although
Sullivan could, consistent with the Model Rules, represent Lehman and some of its
competitors concurrently, Sullivan's relationship with Lehman's competitors, as
well as potential Lehman acquirers, appeared to compromise its representation of
Lehman.
Sullivan failed to share certain information with Lehman out of a perceived
sense of loyalty to another client, Merrill. Sullivan also did not fully carry out its
due diligence into firm client Barclays that seemed intent on acquiring Lehman.
Sullivan ultimately switched sides after the Lehman bankruptcy and represented
Barclays in its acquisition of Lehman's North American investment banking and
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
For previous scholarship in this area pre-dating the current version of the Model
Rules, see Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, When Waiver Should Not Be Good Enough:
An Analysis of Current Client Conflicts Law, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145, 155-56 (1997)
(criticizing Model Rule 1.7); Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE
L.J. 407, 423 (1998) [hereinafter Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts].
9 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4).
'o For example, large law firms such as Sullivan often employ in-house ethics counsel,
and the ethics counsel may have concluded that the representation of Lehman was
appropriate, notwithstanding the conflicts of interests identified in this Article. For a
discussion of the growing importance of ethics counsel in large law firms, see generally
Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General




broker-dealer business." Finally, Sullivan may not have considered whether its
personal interest in preserving its strong relationships with the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve prevented it from aggressively advocating for Lehman.
Part IV attempts to explain why Sullivan's representation of Lehman is
illustrative of a larger problem concerning attorney conflicts of interest rules,
instead of being an isolated instance where a particular client may have been better
served by another law firm. Part IV suggests that there can be negative aspects to
representation from well-known and well-connected attorneys. Lastly, Part V
proposes specific modifications to Rule 1.7. The Rule should be changed such that
attorneys are required to (1) consider whether their conflicts of interest will
frustrate their ability to meet their clients' objectives, and (2) regularly consult
with their clients as to the effect their conflicts of interest are having on the
representation, even if the relevant conflicts were disclosed and consented to at the
beginning of the representation.
Lehman may well have filed for bankruptcy even if it had not received
conflicted representation. Nevertheless, Lehman's experience underscores that
conflict of interest rules do not fully protect even the most sophisticated of clients
and should serve as a cautionary tale for both attorneys and their clients.
I. BACKGROUND TO SULLIVAN'S REPRESENTATION OF LEHMAN
On January 29, 2008, Lehman "reported record revenues of nearly $60 billion
and record earnings in excess of $4 billion for its fiscal year ending November 30,
2007."l12 Less than eight months later, on September 12, 2008, Lehman's stock had
declined 95% from its January value.' 3 On September 15, 2008, Lehman filed for
the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.14
The impact of Lehman's bankruptcy cannot be overstated. As a former vice-
chairman of the Federal Reserve has explained, "[o]n the day Lehman [Brothers]
went into Chapter 11, everything just fell apart." 5 "The Dow Jones index plunged
504 points" on September 15, 2008.16 In the weeks that followed, investors began
"a run on the $3.6 trillion money market industry, which provides short-term
loans" to businesses.' 7 As the credit markets dried up, many large corporations
" See Matt Byrne, The Main Man: Focus on Rodgin Cohen, LAWYER (Sept. 29, 2008),
http://www.thelawyer.com/the-main-man-focus-on-rodgin-cohen/134940.article/; Centers,
supra note 4.
1 1 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 2, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-13555), available at http://lehman
report.jenner.com/ [hereinafter Examiner's Report].
13 id.
I4 Id.
15 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 535 (quoting Alan Binder).
16 See Examiher's Report, supra note 12, at 13.
'7 Bob Ivry et al., Missing Lehman Lesson of Shakeout Means Too Big Banks May
Fail, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2009, 19:01 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aX8D 5utKFuGA.
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such as Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. lacked sufficient funds to pay basic
expenses. 8 Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs appeared as though they would
follow Lehman into bankruptcy. 19 On October 3, 2008, Congress passed the
controversial $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 20 to prevent a
total collapse of the economy.21
The causes of the Lehman bankruptcy have been explored at length.2 2 What is
relatively clear is that regardless of whether a Lehman bankruptcy was inevitable,
Lehman was widely considered to be the weakest of the remaining investment
banks after Bear nearly collapsed in March 2008.23 According to former Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. (Secretary Paulson), Lehman "had the same profile of
sky-high leverage and inadequate liquidity, combined with heavy exposure to real
estate and mortgages that had helped bring down Bear Stearns."24
In its efforts to survive after the near collapse of Bear, Lehman retained
Sullivan and its then-chairman H. Rodgin Cohen (Cohen).25 Sullivan is one of the
most successful law firms in the United States with a network of twelve offices and
nearly eight hundred attorneys.26 Cohen has personally been involved in many of
the most high-profile banking transactions of the last three decades. 27 In 1984, for
example, Cohen helped formulate a $4.5 billion government rescue for Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust,28 the original "too big to fail" bank.2 9 Cohen is
also very well respected by government regulators 30 and had represented Bear and
the directors of Fannie Mae as they faced their own crises earlier in 2008.31 The
8 d.
19 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 417-18.
20 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat
3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 26 U.S.C.).
21 See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 14.
22 See id.; William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 424-26 (2010).
23 See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 4-S.24 HENRY PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 123 (2010).
25 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 193.
26 See About S&C, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/about/
overview/ (last visited July 10, 2012). An unauthorized biography of Sullivan's history was
published in 1988. See NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LIPsius, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE LAW FIRM SULLIVAN & CROMWELL (1988).
27 See H. Rodgin Cohen, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/
lawyers/HRodgin-Cohen/ (last visited July 12, 2012).
28 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 193.29 Id. (quoting Rep. Stewart McKinney) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See id. ("[Timothy] Geithner often relied on [Cohen] to understand the Federal
Reserve's own powers."); see also Hallman, supra note 4, at 76 ("More than any other
lawyer, in a year when relationships with government authorities were invaluable, he knew
which officials to call at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, at the Federal Reserve, [and]
at the Securities and Exchange Commission.").
3 See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 9 (noting representation of Fannie Mae's board of
directors); id. at 93 (noting Cohen's representation of Bear Stearns); see also Centers,
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New York Times has described Mr. Cohen as the "trauma surgeon of Wall Street"
and "the Dean of Wall Street lawyers." 32
One of Cohen's proposals to Lehman management after the near collapse of
Bear was for the investment bank to turn itself into a bank holding company,
which would give the Federal Reserve the jurisdiction to regulate it and would also
have allowed Lehman to access the Federal Reserve's discount lending window
that had traditionally been available only to deposit banks.33 This was ultimately
the strategy pursued by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley when they too
encountered liquidity difficulties after the Lehman bankruptcy.3 4 The Federal
Reserve, however, was concerned at the time that such an act would only cause
investors to lose more confidence in Lehman35 and insisted that Lehman's chief
strategy should be to find a strategic partner or buyer.36
Lehman, with the assistance of Sullivan, contacted many potential investors
and acquirers before its bankruptcy. According to the Lehman Bankruptcy
Examiner's Report, Lehman had discussions with Warren Buffet in late March
200837 and more cursory discussions with Buffet in the days prior to Lehman's
bankruptcy filing.38 Lehman also engaged in serious negotiations with South
Korea's state-run bank KDB from June 2008 to early August 2008,"3 before
negotiations broke down over KDB's concerns regarding Lehman commercial real
estate assets.4 0 Lehman also discussed a purchase with Metlife in July and August
of 200841 and with the Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD) in late August and
early September of the same year.42
supra note 4 (noting that Cohen represented Fannie Mae before the Federal Government
and had represented Bear Steams in its sale to JP Morgan Chase).
32 Alan Feuer, Trauma Surgeon of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at MB1
(New York ed.), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/nyregion/
15cohen.html? r-1&pagewanted=all.
" SORKIN, supra note 4, at 193.
34 See id. at 483.
35 See id. at 192.
36 Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 662-63; PAULSON, supra note 24, at 173
(noting that the government had been pushing Lehman to find a buyer since the failure of
Bear Steams).
3 Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 664-68. It does not appear that Buffett ever
seriously considered investing in Lehman. See id. at 667.
38 See id. at 667-68.
3 Id. at 668-87.
40 Id. at 676-77. The parties also could not reach an agreement on price and KDB was
concerned with whether it could obtain approval of a substantial investment in Lehman
from Korean regulators. Id. at 679-80.
4' Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 687-91. Metlife ultimately declined to invest
in Lehman because of concerns regarding Lehman's residential mortgage assets and
because it did not believe it could complete its due diligence in the timeframe contemplated
by Lehman. Id. at 689-90.
42 Id. at 691-94. ICD appeared to lose interest in Lehman after Lehman's stock
dropped by nearly 50% on September 9, 2008. Id. at 693.
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Beginning in mid-July 2008, most of Lehman's efforts went toward a possible
merger with Bank of America,43 while Barclays emerged as the only remaining
potential acquirer in the days preceding Lehman's bankruptcy filing."
Lehman was nearly able to complete a sale to Barclays that would have
averted a bankruptcy. The proposed transaction would have allowed Barclays to
purchase all of Lehman's businesses for $3 billion.45 Barclays would have also
46agreed to guarantee Lehman's debt as part of the transaction. The Federal
Reserve had managed to convince Lehman's competitors to facilitate the
transaction by funding a spin-off of Lehman that would have contained only the
company's toxic commercial real estate assets. 47 The proposed acquisition
ultimately failed, however, when the British regulators were either unable or
unwilling to approve the transaction.48 According to Secretary Paulson, the British
authorities had misgivings about the financial condition of Lehman and did not
want to "import our cancer." 4 9 Moreover, although any purchase of Lehman would
have required shareholder approval, Barclays never sought a waiver of shareholder
approval requirements from the British Financial Services Agency so that the
transaction could be completed.50 At the urging of the U.S. government, and with
no remaining options, Lehman filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.5
While Sullivan represented Lehman in 2008 as it sought to find a buyer,
Lehman's competitors such as Goldman and Merrill-the latter of which was also
negotiating a sale to Bank of America52-were also Sullivan clients. Barclays, the
bank that nearly acquired Lehman before its bankruptcy, was another Sullivan
43 Id. at 694-703. Bank of America ceased negotiating with Lehman in order to
pursue a purchase of Merrill Lynch. Id. at 700-01. By September 13, 2008, the CEO of
Bank of America would not even accept Lehman CEO Richard Fuld's phone calls. Id. at
701.
71 Id. at 703-10.
45 Id. at 706.
46 Id. at 707.
47 See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 206; SORKIN, supra note 4, at 340-42.
48 See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 207-13. Lawyers for Barclays, as well as
Lehman's CEO, thought that the two companies reached a deal that would have prevented
a bankruptcy. See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 707-08; PAULSON, supra note 24,
at 206 (describing optimism that a deal had been reached for Barclays to acquire Lehman).
49 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 348; see also PAULSON, supra note 24, at 210 (recounting
Chancellor of Exchequer Alistair Darling's statement: "[W]e were asking the British to
take on too big a risk, and he was not willing to have us unload our problem on the British
taxpayer.").
50 Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 709.
5' SORKIN, supra note 4, at 366-68. The Lehman board of directors authorized the
filing even though Lehman's bankruptcy attorneys questioned the basis on which the
federal government could order a corporation to file for bankruptcy. See id. at 358; see also
PAULSON, supra note 24, at 220 (acknowledging that "it was unusual and awkward for a
regulator to push a private sector firm to declare bankruptcy").
52 See, e.g., SORKIN, supra note 4, at 327-28; PAULSON, supra note 24, at 211-12.
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client.5 3 Sullivan did not represent any of these entities in connection with Lehman
before the bankruptcy,5 4 but as this Article will show, these representations
nevertheless appeared to affect Sullivan's representation of Lehman, as did
Sullivan's close relationships with Secretary Paulson and other government
regulators. To fully analyze these potential conflicts of interest and why they are
not adequately addressed by the Model Rules, it is first necessary to analyze how
the Model Rules purport to protect clients from their attorneys' concurrent
conflicts of interest.
II. CONCURRENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST UNDER THE MODEL RULES
A. Rule 1.7 and Its Rationale
Under the Model Rules, which have been adopted by forty-nine states, 55 a
lawyer is generally permitted to represent a client as long as the lawyer has no
concurrent conflict of interest.5 6 A concurrent conflict of interest exists under Rule
1.7 if either the representation of one client "will be directly adverse to another
client" or "there is a significant risk that the representation of one [client] . . . will
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. " As the comment
to Rule 1.7 makes clear, "the mere possibility of subsequent harm" will not
establish a concurrent conflict of interest.5 8 Rather, conflict of interest rules are
designed to ensure the lawyer is loyal to the client and can exercise independent
53 For example, Sullivan represented Barclays with respect to its failed acquisition
of Dutch bank ABN Amro. Lindsay Fortado, Sullivan & Cromwell Regains
Top Spot in Merger Advice (Update4), BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2007 16:56 EDT),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aRRtGG9XzNWw/.
54 As set out in Part 11.B, Sullivan did represent Barclays in its efforts to purchase
Lehman after bankruptcy. Byrne, supra note 11; Centers, supra note 4; text accompanying
note 177.
ss See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rulesof professional conduct.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2012). The Model Rules have also been adopted by the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules
of professionalconduct/alpha list state adoptingmodel-rules.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2012).
56 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2009).
5 Id. Some states have slightly modified Model Rule 1.7. For example, under New
York's professional conduct rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if a "reasonable
lawyer would conclude that either: (1) the representation will involve the lawyer in
representing differing interests; or (2) there is a significant risk that the lawyer's
professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property or other personal interests." N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.7(a) (2011).
58 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
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judgment.5 9 When one lawyer in a firm has a conflict of interest in representing a
client, the conflict is generally imputed to the entire firm.60
The Model Rules do not specify when a representation is "directly adverse" to
another client. Rather, the comment to Rule 1.7 offers illustrative examples such as
when a lawyer acts as an advocate in one matter against a person who the lawyer
represents in an unrelated matter. 61 The comment also suggests that directly
adverse conflicts can arise not only in litigation, but also in transactional matters.62
An example of such a conflict of interest is when a lawyer is asked to represent the
seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer that the lawyer represents in
another unrelated transaction.63
To determine whether the attorney's representation of the client may be
"materially limited" by another representation or the attorney's own interests, the
comment to Rule 1.7 states that the attorney should consider "the likelihood that a
difference in interests will eventuate" and whether the conflict will "materially
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on
behalf of the client." 64
If a lawyer determines that a concurrent conflict of interest exists, the lawyer
can only represent the client (or continue to represent the client) if the following
four conditions are met under Rule 1.7(b):
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
59 See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1.
60 See id. R. 1.10(a). The main exception is if the conflict of interest is based on a
personal interest of a lawyer. But even a conflict of interest based on an attorney's personal
interest can be imputed to a firm if the personal ,interest of the lawyer presents "a
significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining
lawyers in the firm." See id. R. 1.10 cmt. 3. The wisdom of the imputation rule is beyond
the scope of this Article, but for a persuasive early critique, see Charles W. Wolfram,
Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The More Things Change...., 70 TENN. L. REv. 27,
57-59 (2003). Professor Wolfram criticizes the imputation rule for not adequately
considering the increased movement of lawyers between firms and failing to explicitly
allow firms to screen lawyers from working on matters in which they have a conflict of
interest. See id. at 59; see also Ronald Rotunda, Resolving Conflicts by Hiring "Conflicts
Counsel", 62 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 680 (2011) (suggesting that the imputation rule will often
"disqualify a law firm even when there is no legitimate client expectation of loyalty and
confidentiality").
61 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
62 Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 7.
63 Id.
6 Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
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(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.65
The comment to Rule 1.7 states that the purpose of requirements (b)(1)-(3) is
to ensure "the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are
permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of
interest."66 Informed consent presumes that the client has consented to the conflict
only after the lawyer has explained "the relevant circumstances and . . . the
material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse
effects on the interests of that client."67
Permitting clients to accept conflicted representation arguably safeguards
client autonomy.68 At the same time, clients cannot consent to all conflicts of
interest under Rule 1.7. A lawyer cannot, for example, bring a claim on behalf of
one client against another client that the lawyer represents in the same proceeding
even if both clients consent69 because there is "institutional interest in vigorous
development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against
each other."70
In addition, Rule 1.7(b)(1) requires that lawyers reasonably believe they can
provide competent and diligent representation in spite of a conflict of interest.7 1
The central question attorneys must consider is whether their performance would
be "objectively inadequate"72 on account of their conflict of interest, and therefore
whether they should not proceed with the representation regardless of the client's
65 Id. R. 1.7(b).
66 Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 15.
67 Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 18. The former version of Rule 1.7 did not require that the client
provide informed consent to the conflict of interest or that the consent be confirmed in
writing. See ABA, REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
REPORTER'S EXPLANATION R. 1.7 (2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/e2k/10 85rem.authcheckdam.pdf.
68 See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 8, at 412; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(iv) (2000) ("Concern for client
autonomy generally warrants respecting a client's informed consent."). As Professor
Zacharias suggests, it can be reasonable for clients to choose lawyers with conflicts of
interests in many circumstances. For example, if cost is an issue, even two potential
antagonists might be willing to accept common counsel. See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts,
supra note 8, at 414-15. The conflicted lawyer may also be the most qualified, or the client
may simply be most comfortable with that lawyer. Id. at 415. Lastly, in smaller towns,
there may be a dearth of lawyers such that a client would have no practical choice but to
accept a lawyer with a conflict of interest. Id. at 416.
69 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(3).
ToId. R. 1.7 cmt. 17.
7 Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
72 See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 8, at 413.
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willingness to consent to the conflicted representation. 73 In this manner, Rule 1.7
attempts to respect client autonomy while still protecting clients from truly ill-
advised representations.
B. Doubts Concerning Rule 1.7's Efficacy
One striking aspect of Rule 1.7 is the degree to which much of the evaluation
of an attorney's conflict of interest does not involve the client. For example,
although attorneys are required to have procedures in place to help identify
potential conflicts of interest, 74 once the conflict is identified, the attorney alone
determines whether a representation is "directly adverse" with another
representation or may be "materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer." 75
If the lawyer determines that he does in fact have a concurrent conflict of
interest that must be disclosed to the client, the lawyer is not required to consider
whether the conflict may interfere with the lawyer's ability to satisfy the client's
expectations of the representation. Rather, Rule 1.7(b)(1) states that the attorney
may carry out the representation as long as he "reasonably believes that the lawyer
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client." 7 6 Although a client may expect far more than "competent and diligent
representation" from an attorney, the Rule only seeks to assure that clients obtain
this minimal level of representation.77
Prior to 2002, for a conflict of interest to be consentable under the Model
Rules, an attorney was required to determine that the concurrent conflict of interest
would not "adversely affect the representation" pursuant to Rule 1.7(b)( 1).78 The
change in Rule 1.7(b)(1) was motivated by attorneys' professed confusion
regarding the circumstances under which client consent to a conflict of interest
could be sought.79 By replacing the requirement that an attorney consider whether
a conflict is likely to "adversely affect the representation" with a reference to the
lawyer's duty to provide "competent and diligent representation," the drafters
believed that they were articulating a "relatively clear standard" as to when a client
could consent to a conflict.80
Regardless of whether the change of rule provides a clearer standard, Rule
1.7(b)(1) is largely redundant in its present form because the Model Rules already
73 See McMunigal, supra note 5, at 861 ("Perhaps the central question for a risk
approach to conflict of interest is defining which risks are acceptable and which are
unacceptable.").
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3.
71 Id. R. 1.7(b).
76 Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
77 id.





require attorneys to provide competent and diligent representation. Furthermore,
there is the possibility that the rule may encourage lawyers to believe that the
majority of conflicts of interest are consentable by allowing them to overlook their
conflicts' effects on their clients. As has been widely chronicled, lawyers generally
have high opinions of their own abilities, 8 2 and few lawyers are likely to believe
that they cannot provide competent and diligent representation because of a
conflict of interest, even if there is a possibility that the client would be better
served by another attorney or firm. As Professor Zacharias has noted, "In all but
the most egregious conflict situations, lawyers can convince themselves that they
can represent multiple clients competently, on the theory that they are able to
manage psychological pressures through the exercise of professional
detachment."83
Empirical research also provides some support for the proposition that
lawyers view most conflicts of interest as consentable and that clients can therefore
waive. them. In Professor Gross's survey concerning conflicts of interest sent to
attorneys who graduated from the Southern Illinois University School of Law,
68% of the responding attorneys claimed to inform their clients that conflicts were
nonwaivable less than 10% of the time, and another 15% stated that they informed
their clients that the conflicts were nonwaivable only 25% of the time.8 4 Although
these results should be considered with caution given that they only reflect the
responses of 157 lawyers from one particular jurisdiction,85 The study does tend to
confirm that lawyers will usually believe that they can provide competent and
diligent representation notwithstanding a conflict of interest, and few lawyers will
apparently decline or terminate a representation solely because they have a conflict
of interest. 86
Of course, for a lawyer to represent a client in spite of a concurrent conflict of
interest, the attorney must disclose the conflict and the client must give "informed
consent" to the conflicted representation pursuant to Rule 1.7(b)(4). Presumably, if
81 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1; id. R. 1.3.
82 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities
Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases, and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 629, 650
(1997) ("Probably far more lawyers pride themselves on independence and good judgment
than consistently exhibit it."); Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are
Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTREDAME L. REv. 671, 701 (2010) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Steroids and Legal Ethics].
83 Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics, supra note 82, at 701.
84 See Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest
Rules Consistent with Principles ofBehavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS I 11,
149 (2006).
8 See id. at 127-28. Additionally, the study does not differentiate between the
situation where an attorney concludes that he cannot provide "competent and diligent
representation" under MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) from the situation
where the representation is expressly prohibited by MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7(b)(3). See Gross, supra note 84, at 127 n.78.
86 Gross, supra note 84, at 149; see also Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 8, at
422 (suggesting attorneys have an incentive to obtain misguided conflict waivers).
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a client seeks more than just the minimum level of "competent and diligent
representation"" and is concerned with whether the attorney can meet his or her
expectations of the representation, the client could choose to retain other counsel.
In practice, however, clients' ability to protect themselves may be limited
because attorneys are likely to understate the seriousness of conflicts of interests
out of economic self-interest. 88 Equally important, clients may be unable to
meaningfully assess the impact of the conflict of interest before the representation
has started and will be hesitant to second-guess their original choice of counsel.
Clients may also overestimate their attorneys' ability to compensate for their
conflicts of interest.90 Most clients appear to be willing to waive their attorneys'
conflicts of interest whatever the precise reason. Under Professor Gross's survey,
63% of attorneys reported that their clients waived the conflict of interest virtually
all the time, with an additional 19% reporting that clients waived conflicts 90% of
the time.91
It is somewhat puzzling that so many clients are willing to accept conflicted
representation because, in disclosing conflicts of interest to their clients, attorneys
are in effect conceding that the conflict will "materially limit" their representation
pursuant to Rule 1.7(a)(2). One plausible explanation for this behavior may be that
clients are willing to waive an attorney's conflict of interest and accept conflicted
representation because they calculate that conflicted representation from a
particular attorney is preferable to being represented by other counsel. But even if
most clients waive conflicts of interest on this basis, social psychology research
suggests that attorneys' act of disclosing their conflicts of interest-as they are
required to do by Rule 1.7(b)(4)-may have the unfortunate effect of amplifying
the conflicts' adverse effect on the representation. 9 2 As Professor Eldred has noted,
there are a variety of explanations for this phenomenon:
In some situations, advisors may "compensate" unconsciously for the
effects of disclosure "by further skewing their advice" to a client.
Similarly, once bias is disclosed, the decision-maker might
unconsciously feel that the advisor has been ethical and thus is deserving
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
88 See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 8, at 422; see also Gross, supra note
84, at 119 ("[L]awyers will be ... likely to understate their own conflicts of interest when
doing so will produce .. . tangible gain for them.").
89 See Gross, supra note 84, at 123-24; see also Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra
note 8, at 423 ("[T]he self-interested lawyer who views the conflicts provisions as a
roadblock to be circumvented often can obtain misguided waivers. . .. By the time the case
reaches court, the lawyer will have prepared her client and convinced him that she is
essential to his cause.").
90 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 40 (2009).
91 Gross, supra note 84, at 149.
92 See Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 79 (2009).
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of more, rather than less, trust. Finally, disclosure may result in what has
been called "moral licensing," which makes the advisor believe that,
because the risks have been disclosed, there is less reason to "toe the
ethical line and look out for the interests of those receiving their
advice."93
To truly mitigate the effects of conflicts of interest, recent research suggests
that advisors must fear sanction for failing to act in the interests of their clients.9 4
However, disciplinary authorities rarely sanction attorneys for misconduct that
does not involve the mishandling of client funds. 95 Consequently, from the
perspective of the attorney, once a client's consent to a conflict of interest is
obtained, there is little risk in proceeding with a conflicted representation.
The next section discusses three specific conflicts of interest that impacted the
representation that Sullivan provided to Lehman. It also seeks to answer why a
highly sophisticated client like Lehman could not ensure that its attorneys'
conflicts would not interfere with the representation that it received.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN SULLIVAN'S REPRESENTATION OF LEHMAN
Three conflicts of interest compromised the representation that Sullivan could
provide to Lehman. First, Sullivan had duties not only to Lehman but also to
Merrill, which, like Lehman, was seeking to sell itself to Bank of America. Second,
Sullivan had a conflict of interest because it was seeking to sell Lehman to another
firm client, Barclays, and in fact, transitioned from representing Lehman to
representing Barclays after Lehman filed for bankruptcy-an experience that one
Sullivan attorney likened to going "from shirts to skins." 9 6 Lastly, Sullivan's
reputational interests-and those of Cohen in particular-may have precluded the
firm from taking a more aggressive stance with the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury on Lehman's behalf. This section contrasts Sullivan's representation in
this regard to that offered by Lehman's bankruptcy counsel, Weil, Gotshal, &
Manges, LLP.
As noted in the introduction of this Article, the purpose of examining
Sullivan's representation of Lehman is not to determine whether Sullivan violated
the Model Rules or the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility
(NY Lawyer's Code) that was in effect in New York when Sullivan represented
9 Id. (citations omitted).
94 See Bryan K. Church & Xi (Jason) Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure, and
(Costly) Sanctions: Experimental Evidence, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 526-27 (2009).
95 Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L.
REv. 829, 861-62 (2002).
96 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 379.
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Lehman.97 As a sophisticated law firm, Sullivan probably had Lehman consent to
any conflicts that the firm was aware of with respect to other clients and had
Lehman waive future conflicts as well. 98 Moreover, while Sullivan's ability to
always act in Lehman's interests may have been limited by the firm's conflicts of
interest, there is no reason to believe that Sullivan did not, on the whole, represent
Lehman competently and diligently in 2008. For these reasons, Sullivan likely
satisfied Rule 1.7, as well as the applicable provisions of the New York Lawyer's
Code. 99
Nevertheless, although Sullivan may not have violated any disciplinary rules
in representing Lehman, Sullivan's relationships with Merrill, Barclays, and
banking regulators gave rise to concurrent conflicts of interest that made it more
difficult for Sullivan to represent Lehman and made a Lehman bankruptcy a more
realistic option for the company.
A. Perceived Duties to Merrill
While representing Lehman, Sullivan also represented Goldman, Merrill, and
other investment banks that were Lehman's competitors.'00 Under the Model Rules,
97 The New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility has been replaced by
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct as of April 1, 2009. See N.Y. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT (2011).
98 See Michael J. DiLemia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law
Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 97 (2009) ("Advance waivers of conflicts of
interest have become an essential business and ethics practice for large law firms in the
United States."). Scholarly opinion, however, remains divided. Compare Lawrence J. Fox,
All's OK Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on Privacy, Obscene Rule on
Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701, 715-17 (2001) (criticizing such waivers), with Jonathan J.
Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective Client Waivers as a Mature
Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship-A Response to Mr. Fox, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971,
972-73 (2001) (defending prospective waivers, particularly for sophisticated clients); see
also Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 312
(2000) (suggesting prospective waivers should generally be enforced if they are
unambiguous and the client was represented by counsel in signing the waiver, but that any
ambiguity should be construed against the attorney seeking the waiver).
9 Conflicts of interest under the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility are regulated by Canon 5. Canon 5 expressly provides that an attorney may
carry out a representation of clients with differing interests if both clients consent, unless "a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that any of the affected clients should not agree to the
representation under the circumstances." N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-16 (2007). Given that "there are many instances in which a lawyer may properly
serve multiple clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving
litigation," id. at EC 5-15, Sullivan could have reasonably concluded that it could proceed
with the representation of Lehman assuming that it obtained the requisite consents.
100 The relationship between Sullivan and Goldman has long been particularly close.
See John Carney, Goldman Sachs' Special Relationship with Sullivan & Cromwell Is Alive




these representations would not give rise to a concurrent conflict of interest
because "simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose
interests are only economically adverse . . . does not ordinarily constitute a conflict
of interest."o' Since Sullivan did not appear to represent Goldman, Merrill, or any
other investment bank against Lehman during the financial crisis, Sullivan's
decision to represent Lehman would not have created a concurrent conflict of
interest under the Model Rules.
Furthermore, Sullivan, like most large, modem law firms, probably had
Lehman waive any conflicts that could arise with respect to Goldman, Merrill, and
other clients.102 The waiver would have likely taken the following form:
Our firm has in the past and will continue to represent clients listed on
the attached Exhibit A (each an "Exhibit A Client") in matters not
substantially related to this engagement. Accordingly, each Client agrees
to waive any objection, based upon this engagement, to any current or
future representation by the firm of any of the Exhibit A Clients, its
respective parent, subsidiaries and affiliates in any matter not
substantially related to this representation. Of course, we will not accept
any representation that is adverse to you in this matter.'0 3
It is also possible that the waiver extended to all Sullivan clients and not merely a
subset thereof.104
Under the Model Rules, lawyers may obtain such open-ended waivers of
conflicts of interest when a client is an "experienced user of the legal services
involved," like Lehman, and as long as the conflict is otherwise consentable.'05
The comment also suggests that these waivers are most effective when the client is
"independently represented by other counsel in giving consent," 06 as Lehman
would have been through its in-house counsel. The rationale for treating
sophisticated and unsophisticated clients differently in terms of waiving conflicts
of interest is that the former are presumed to better understand attorney conflicts of
Sullivan represented Merrill Lynch in the $16 billion sale of Merrill Lynch's asset-
management business to BlackRock. See Jon Parker, Skadden and Sullivan Bag $16Bn
BlackRock Roles, LAWYER (Feb. 20, 2006), http://www.thelawyer.com/skadden-and-
sullivan-bag-$16bn-blackrock-roles/118881.article/. Cohen himself may not have
represented Lehman and any of its competitors concurrently, but any representation of
other investment banks by Sullivan would have been imputed to Cohen pursuant to MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a).
101 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
102 DiLernia, supra note 98, at 97.
103 Id. at 100 (citing Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1336
(S.D. Fla. 2001)).
'0 See id. at 99 (comparing general waivers with regard to clients as opposed to
specific waivers with regard to clients).
105 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22.
1o6 id.
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interest and are less vulnerable to lawyer overreaching.'0 7 The permissibility of
having experienced users of legal services provide general, advance consent to
attorney conflicts of interest has been affirmed by opinions of the American Bar
Association, the District of Columbia Bar Association, and the New York City Bar
Association.'0o
Although the concurrent representation of Lehman and its competitors in
unrelated matters was in accordance with the Model Rules, Sullivan's
representation became more problematic as Lehman's situation worsened. As
Cohen was seeking to complete the sale of Lehman to Bank of America in the
week prior to Lehman's bankruptcy, Gregory Fleming, Merrill Lynch's president
and chief operating officer, 09 contacted Cohen to determine how negotiations were
proceeding between Bank of American and Lehman.' 10 Sullivan had recently
advised Merrill in the sale of its asset management business to BlackRock.' "
Cohen quickly determined that Merrill was, like Lehman, seeking to be acquired
by Bank of America and refused to answer any of Fleming's questions. 1 12 Fleming
then confided: "We've got to do a deal. The numbers are looking too risky. If
Lehman goes, we'll be next."" 3
This was potentially crucial information because Lehman had been under the
apparent misimpression that it alone was negotiating with Bank of America. 14
Nevertheless, Cohen did not share the information with Lehman until days later."' 5
Indeed, Cohen never shared the substance of his conversation with Fleming with
Lehman and informed Lehman that its prospective sale to Bank of America was in
jeopardy only after Timothy Geithner (Geithner), the then-President of the New
York Federal Reserve, revealed to Cohen that Bank of America was likely to
acquire Merrill instead. 16
If Merrill had not been Sullivan's client, it is possible that Fleming may have
never confided in Cohen in the first place. Moreover, Lehman may have been
unlikely to merge with Bank of America even if Cohen had disclosed what he
learned from Fleming. In Secretary Paulson's view, Bank of America had never
107 See Wolfram, supra note 60, at 44. But see Fox, supra note 5, at 574-76
(criticizing the "myth" of the sophisticated client).
108 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005);
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
2006-1 (2006); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 309 (2001).
1o9 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 276.
"0 Id. at 253.
"'1 Parker, supra note 100.
112 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 277.
113 Id.
114 See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 190; see also SORKIN, supra note 4, at 276
(describing Fuld's view that a merger was imminent).
115 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 276, 329.
1 16 See id. at 329.
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truly been interested in purchasing Lehman,' 17 and former Lehman executives
suspect that Lehman may have been a "bargaining chip" to use against Merrill." 8
Nevertheless, it would have unquestionably been in the best interests of
Lehman for Cohen to share the substance of the Fleming conversation with
Lehman. For example, if Lehman had known that Bank of America and Merrill
were negotiating, Lehman could have lowered its demands of Bank of America. It
could have also chosen to divert more of its energies to other potential acquirers.
None of these actions would have necessarily allowed Lehman to avoid
bankruptcy, but Cohen could not recommend either of these options without
effectively revealing what he had learned from Fleming." 9 Since Cohen possessed
material information that he felt he could not disclose out of concern for another
client, Sullivan had a conflict of interest that materially limited the representation
of Lehman.12 0 Lehman did eventually learn of the negotiations,121 but part of the
materiality calculus is whether it would have been valuable to the client to possess
the information earlier,' 22 as it would have been here.
To be sure, clients do not have any legitimate expectation that their lawyers
will use confidential information obtained from other clients for their benefit.12 3
But the information provided to Cohen was not protected by attorney
confidentiality. A lawyer is prohibited only from revealing "information relating to
representation of the client," 2 4 and the information provided by Fleming was
unrelated to any representation of Merrill. Indeed, Fleming did not contact Cohen
in reference to any matter Sullivan may have been handling for Merrill, but
because he knew that Cohen was representing Lehman and hoped to obtain
"' See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 195 ("[I]t was increasingly obvious that [Bank of
America CEO Ken Lewis] didn't really want to buy Lehman.").
18 Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 701.
"l9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2009); see also S.C. Bar Ethics
Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 91-33, 1991 WL 787761, at *1 (1991) (holding where an
attorney has information that should be disclosed to one client but disclosing the
information would be injurious to another client's case, the attorney has a nonconsentable
conflict of interest).
120 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof 1 & Judicial Ethics,
Fonnal Op. 2005-02, 2005 WL 682188, at *6; Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n Prof'1
Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. No. 463, at 8 (1990).
See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 329.
122 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof 1 & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2005-02, 2005 WL 682188, at *6.
121 Id. at *2.
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a); see also id. R. 1.8 cmt. 5 ("Use of
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the
lawyer's duty of loyalty." (emphasis added)); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York
Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2005-02, 2005 WL 682188, at *3 (holding
attorneys are generally only required to refrain from sharing confidences and secrets
obtained from a client).
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information concerning the negotiations from someone he considered a close
friend. 125
This is not to minimize the dilemma that Cohen faced. If he had revealed what
he learned from Fleming, this could potentially hurt Sullivan's relationship with
Merrill,126 and there was no guarantee that Lehman would be able to complete a
transaction with Bank of America.' 27 Moreover, although Fleming appeared to not
be approaching Cohen in his capacity as Merrill's lawyer, the Model Rules are
sufficiently ambiguous such that the decision to preserve the confidence of
Fleming may have seemed like an ethical course of action,12 8 even though the
decision was clearly contrary to Lehman's interests. Lastly, assuming that Lehman
waived Sullivan's client conflicts at the start of the representation, Cohen may
have assumed that Lehman knowingly assumed the risk that the firm would not
share all relevant information that it possessed through its relationships with other
clients. 129
Of course, to continue with the representation of Lehman, Sullivan would
have had to reasonably believe that it could provide "competent and diligent
representation" in spite of its decision to not disclose that Merrill and Bank of
America were in negotiations. 3 o Although it would have certainly been beneficial
for Lehman to know that its deal with Bank of America was in jeopardy, neither
Rule 1.1 (competence) nor Rule 1.3 (diligence) specifically requires attorneys to
share all material information in their possession with the client, let alone
125 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 277.
126 Aside from any perceived duties owed to Merrill Lynch, Cohen may have felt that
he should preserve the confidence of Fleming as a friend. This would also constitute a
cognizable concurrent conflict of interest under the Model Rules if Cohen felt that the
representation of Lehman would be materially limited by his responsibilities to his friend.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1); see also S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Advisory Op. 07-03, 2007 WL 7264729, at *1 (noting a conflict of interest exists
when a lawyer has a personal relationship with an individual such that there is a risk that
the lawyer's professional judgment and loyalty to a client could be compromised by the
personal relationship, and the lawyer may impart confidences to the individual).
127 For this reason, it was arguably in Cohen's self-interest to prioritize his
relationship with Merrill over that of Lehman given that the former was more likely to
survive the financial crisis.
128 Attorney-client confidentiality is a foundational principle of the American legal
profession. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting confidentiality
rules contribute to the "trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship" and help
ensure that "the law is upheld"). Ethics opinions suggest that the obligation should be
construed broadly. See, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Ethics Op. 695, 2004
WL 833032, at * 1 (2004); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility,
Informal Op. 2000-05, 2000 WL 1616078, at *1 (2000). Moreover, notwithstanding
Cohen's duties to Lehman, as a client of Sullivan, Merrill was also owed a duty of loyalty,
and as such, Cohen was required to refrain from "disadvantageous use of client
information." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 5.
129 See Eldred, supra note 92, at 79 (describing the phenomenon of "moral licensing").
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
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information obtained from other clients. 131 Sullivan could have revealed this
information, and it would have been in the best interests of Lehman for it to do so.
But Rule 1.7 does not explicitly require attorneys to decline or terminate a
representation once a conflict of interest prevents them from acting in the client's
best interest.132
It is not unexpected that a law firm-even one as well-known as Sullivan-
would choose to continue to represent a client notwithstanding a potentially serious
conflict of interest. As Professor Gross's study suggests, few attorneys seem to
conclude that they cannot provide "competent and diligent representation" 33 solely
because of a conflict of interest.134 The fact that Lehman probably waived any
future conflicts with respect to Sullivan clients also made it less likely that Sullivan
would look out for the interests of Lehman at the expense of these other clients.'35
Of course, it may have been perfectly logical for Lehman to waive any conflicts
that Sullivan might have had in virtue of representing Lehman's competitors.
Lehman could not have anticipated at the outset of the representation that the
economy would degenerate to the point that both it and Merrill would need to
merge with Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy.' 36 Even towards the end of the
representation, as the field of potential purchasers shrank, Lehman would not have
"' There is some authority to suggest that MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3
and 1.4 require the disclosure of material information where it is crucial to a client's case.
See Pa. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics & Prof I Responsibility Comm., Informal Op. 95-48, 1995
WL 935660, at *1 (1995) (holding an attorney in a domestic relations matter arguably
violates PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1987) if he does not reveal to his client
that her husband also sought to be retained by the attorney); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 07-03, 2007 WL 7264729, at * 1 (2007) (holding an attorney
would violate his duty of diligence if he does not disclose in a divorce case the identity of
his client's husband's lover that he learned through another representation); see also
Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding an attorney
breaches his fiduciary duty to a client where he "negligently or willfully withholds from his
client information material to the client's decision to pursue a given course of action").
Although Sullivan's failure to disclose that Merrill and Bank of America were negotiating
may have materially limited its representation, it is unclear whether the information was of
such importance that the failure to disclose it was sanctionable or a breach of fiduciary duty.
This is particularly so because Lehman was negotiating with other buyers besides Bank of
America and, in any event, soon learned of Bank of America's interest in Merrill. See
SORKIN, supra note 4, at 329.
132 One could argue that such a duty follows from the lawyer's duty to provide
diligent representation pursuant to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3. However,
while this Rule requires an attorney to act with "commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client," it also stresses that a "lawyer is not bound ... to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client." Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
13Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).
134 See discussion supra Part II.B.
135 See Eldred, supra note 92, at 79 (noting counterproductive effects of disclosing
conflicts of interest).
136 Merrill believed until the week leading up to the Lehman bankruptcy that it could
survive by selling a small stake in the firm. See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 309.
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expected that a Merrill director would provide information to Cohen that was
highly relevant to Lehman's negotiations with Bank of America.
Nevertheless, as explored in the next section, even when a sophisticated client
like Lehman is fully aware that its interests might be opposed to those of another
current client of its law firm, the client may be unable to ensure that the
representation it receives is not compromised.
B. The Barclays Blind Spot
Of all of Lehman's potential acquirers, Barclays appeared to be the most
interested in purchasing Lehman.' 37 Barclays was also a Sullivan client. In the
summer of 2007, Sullivan had represented Barclays in its attempted acquisition of
the Dutch bank ABN Amro. 138 Cohen himself worked on several matters for
Barclays in the United States, including its first U.S. public offering. 19 This
section explores whether Sullivan's relationship with Barclays prevented it from
fully defending Lehman's interests in its negotiations with Barclays.
The Model Rules do not forbid a lawyer from representing a client in selling a
business to another client. A concurrent conflict of interest would exist in such a
situation under Rule 1.7(a)(1) because the interdsts of the seller are "directly
adverse" to those of the buyer,14 0 but the comment to the Rule states that a lawyer
can nevertheless undertake such a representation with the informed consent of each
client. 141
Pursuant to Rule 1.7(b)(1), the lawyer or firm would also have to reasonably
believe "that it could provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client." Although few ethics opinions have addressed the issue, the
prevailing view is that transactional matters are generally less likely to impact an
attorney's ability to provide "competent and diligent" representation than litigation
conflicts. 142 Consequently, there are many situations where a lawyer, with
disclosure and consent, may represent one client in a transaction with another
client.143 One possible exception is where a lawyer or firm endeavors to represent
two clients with differing interests in the same transaction, although such a
'3 See id. at 258 (noting Barclay's had been monitoring Lehman for months as part of
a planned expansion into the United States).
i3 Fortado, supra note 53.
13 See H. Rodgin Cohen, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www.sullcrom.com/
lawyers/HRodgin-Cohen/ (last visited July 12, 2012).
140 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2009).
141 See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 7.
142 See N.Y.C. Ass'n Bar Comm. Prof 1 Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1, 2006 WL
1662501, at *6; N.Y.C. Ass'n Bar Comm. Prof 1 Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-2, 2001
WL 1870202, at *3 (2001); see also N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-15 (2007) ("[T]here are many instances in which a lawyer may properly serve
multiple clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving litigation.").
143 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof I & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2001-2, 2001 WL 1870202, at *3.
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representation is not explicitly prohibited by Rule 1.7(b).144 As Sullivan did not
appear to be representing Barclays with respect to Lehman, the concurrent
representation of Barclays and Lehman would have been permitted under the
Model Rules if both clients gave informed consent.14 5
There has been little analysis as to why litigation conflicts should be viewed
differently than transactional conflicts. One explanation may be that in
transactional matters, parties' interests are usually "overlapping in the sense that
both share the goal of consummating the transaction." 4 6 It is certainly the case,
however, that parties in litigation may share the ultimate goal of settling a matter,
just as the parties seeking to complete a transaction may be interested in doing so
only on terms that are very disadvantageous to the other side. Moreover, as
Professor Freedman has observed, transactional work will always have adversarial
aspects because "[tlhe advice given to a client and acted upon today may
strengthen or weaken the client's position in negotiations or litigation next
year." 47
Even assuming transactional conflicts are less problematic than litigation
conflicts, Barclays' proposed acquisition of Lehman was hardly a typical
transaction. Barclays had only officially approached Lehman in the week prior to
its bankruptcy.14 8 Barclays' board of directors authorized the beginning of due
diligence on September 12, 2008,149 and the first meeting between Barclays' CEO,
Robert Diamond, and Lehman CEO, Richard Fuld, occurred later that same day.150
At the meeting, Diamond apparently informed Fuld that "this is a horrible situation
for you, because we're only going to be interested if the price is quite
distressed."15'
Moreover, hanging over the negotiations was the reality that if negotiations
failed, Barclays would have the option of purchasing Lehman's prime assets in
bankruptcy. Before Lehman even made the decision to file for bankruptcy, it had
engaged in discussions with Barclays concerning a potential acquisition of the
' Id.; see Ohio Bd. Comm'rs Grievances & Discipline, Advisory Op. 2009-3, 2009
WL 1764109, at *7 (2009) ("[A] lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation
whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic, regardless of their consent." (quoting OHIO
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 38 (2007))); see also Pa. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics &
Prof 1 Responsibility Comm., Informal Op. 90-80, 1990 WL 709625, at *1 (1990) (holding
once the relationship between lender and borrower represented in the same transaction
becomes adversarial, the attorney should withdraw).
145 As noted in Part III.A, supra, the informed consent to Sullivan's client conflicts
may have been provided via a prospective waiver.
146 Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2001-2, 2001 WL 1870202, at *3.
147 Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
EMORY L.J. 467, 469-70 (1992).
148 See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 703-06.
"9 Id. at 704-05.
i"o Id. at 705.
'' See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 288.
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lucrative Lehman broker-dealer unit in bankruptcy.' 52 Three days after negotiations
ended and Lehman entered bankruptcy, Barclays purchased Lehman's broker-
dealer unit and the North American investment banking operations for $1.75
billion.153
Sullivan may not have appreciated that Lehman and Barclays had potentially
divergent interests in the negotiations. While Lehman unquestionably wished to
sell, Barclays' primary motivation may have been to ensure that it could purchase
Lehman's most valuable assets at a "fire-sale price" after a Lehman bankruptcy
was assured.15 4
There is some evidence to suggest that Sullivan failed to fully protect Lehman
by not investigating whether Barclays may have overestimated its capability to
acquire Lehman.155 The British Financial Services Authority (FSA) had informed
Barclays that any acquisition of Lehman would require a shareholder vote-a vote
that could have taken up to two months to complete-and Barclays did not share
this information with either Lehman or U.S. regulators. 156 Indeed, Lehman's
negotiators were under the mistaken impression that regulatory approval was not
an issue.157 To actually conclude any purchase, Barclays would have had to either
convince British regulators to waive the shareholder voting requirements or find a
partner to guarantee Lehman's trades until it could obtain shareholder approval to
proceed with the purchase.' 58 Barclays never formally submitted paperwork for the
FSA to review the transaction and did not follow up with a potential partner who
expressed interest in backstopping Lehman's operations until the transaction could
close. 159
Sullivan is obviously not responsible for the fact that Barclays was not as
forthcoming as it could have been with information concerning FSA approval. It is
nevertheless surprising that in a transaction of this size and significance that
Lehman's lawyers did not insist on documentation to substantiate Barclays'
152 See id. at 363-64.
15 See Ben White & Eric Dash, Barclays Reaches $1.75 Billion Deal for a Lehman
Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
09/18/business/worldbusiness/18barclays.html.
154 Id.; see SORKIN, supra note 4, at 364, 378.
1ss A less charitable view would be that Barclays deliberately misrepresented its
ability to purchase Lehman to ensure that Lehman would not find another acquirer. See
SORKIN, supra note 4, at 378 (noting views that Barclays' interest may have been a
"charade"). In this regard, it is significant that Barclays had not been known for closing
large transactions or moving on an expedited basis, and before even speaking to Lehman,
its CEO Robert Diamond pressed the Federal Reserve to ensure that Barclays would be the
exclusive bidder for Lehman. See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 180, 184.
156 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 324; see also PAULSON, supra note 24, at 207 (noting
Barclays first informed the Federal Reserve of the FSA requirements on September 14,
2008).
157 Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 707.
151 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 324.
159 See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 708-09. The potential partner was
Warren Buffet. Id. at 708.
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position that British regulators would permit Barclays to acquire Lehman. Lehman
and Sullivan were shocked to learn on September 14, 2008, that the FSA would
not approve the acquisition.160
Although there may have been insufficient time for Sullivan to obtain all of
the documentation that would generally accompany a transaction of such size,
Sullivan certainly could have had U.S. regulators contact the FSA to ensure that
Barclays had the authority to proceed. Sullivan lawyers could have also contacted
the FSA directly. Cohen was a personal friend of Callum McCarthy, the FSA's
chairman.'6 1 Cohen did eventually contact McCarthy, but only after the Federal
Reserve informed him that the FSA would not approve Barclays' acquisition of
Lehman.162 By then it was too late to resuscitate the deal or find another potential
acquirer. 6 3
Of course, lawyers should not be ethically obligated to use all of their
personal connections in the service of their clients.164 Moreover, as noted, Cohen
and other Sullivan attorneys were operating under massive time pressures, so it is
understandable that there would be some oversights in terms of due diligence. But
it is fair to ask whether different attorneys may have at least considered the
possibility that Barclays was overestimating its interest and capacity to acquire
Lehman to better position itself to acquire the most lucrative assets of the company
in bankruptcy. Sullivan, conversely, seemed to take for granted that Barclays was
serious in its intention to save Lehman and that its assurances concerning
regulatory approval were believable.'65
The notion that even talented attorneys like Cohen can have blind spots when
it comes to their clients is not novel. Professor Langevoort has suggested that
lawyers practice defensive avoidance to ignore red flags concerning possible client
misconduct.' 66 In transactional work, defensive avoidance is an adaptive trait so
that lawyers can commit to their clients' positions and serve as effective
negotiators.167 If this view is correct, then it is highly dubious that lawyers can
simply drop their commitments to a client and adopt a more skeptical view of the
client and the client's intentions simply because a lawyer is now negotiating
against the client.' 68 Rather, once a lawyer voluntarily commits to a client, "there is
160 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 349-50; PAULSON, supra note 24, at 212-14.
161 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 350. Cohen had been Barclays' lawyer in the 1990s
when McCarthy had been a Barclays banker. Id.
I62 Id.
163 See id.
'6 A complicating factor is that Lehman may have chosen to be represented by
Sullivan because of the firm's political connections and those of Cohen in particular.
16s See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 349 (noting Cohen was "incredulous" that the British
regulators would not approve the sale of Lehman to Barclays).
166 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 77, 103-
04 (1993).
167 Id. at 104.
168 This point is illustrated in the criminal law context by Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162 (2002), as recounted by Professor Eldred. Mickens, a death row inmate who was
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a strong subconscious need to maintain consistency in the face of subsequent
events, to justify the commitment to themselves and others." 169 This may
especially be the case if the lawyer, as with Cohen and Sullivan vis-a-vis Barclays,
has represented the client for a significant period of time.'70
Another likely contributing factor was that Sullivan had just represented
Barclays in its failed acquisition of ABN Amro.17' Barclays had been bitterly
disappointed by the failure of that deal.17 2 Lawyers commonly internalize their
clients' goals, 7 3 and Sullivan likely assumed that Barclays was still very serious
about expanding its operations.17 4 Time pressures would have amplified Sullivan's
blind spot concerning Barclays' possible ulterior motives."7
Lawyers-particularly highly accomplished lawyers-may believe that they
can neatly cabin the representation of one client from the representation of another
such that they will not be affected by their clients' divergent interests. 176 The
Model Rules encourage this belief by allowing attorneys to undertake a
representation even if they recognize that they have a concurrent conflict of
interest caused by their duties to another client as long as the criteria of Rule 1.7(b)
are satisfied. An attorney's commitment to a client, however, will not necessarily
disappear because the lawyer is now negotiating against that client-particularly
where a lawyer has had a longstanding and continuing relationship with the client.
Sullivan likely would have been far less sanguine of Barclays' ability to acquire
Lehman if it had no previous relationship with Barclays.
convicted of murder and forced sodomy, claimed that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney had not disclosed that he previously represented Mickens's
victim. Eldred, supra note 92, at 44. Mickens alleged that because of his previous
representation, the attorney had failed to investigate whether the victim had been a male
prostitute and may have consented to sexual relations. Id. Although clearly troubled by the
attorney's lack of disclosure of the conflict, the Supreme Court rejected the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because the Court accepted the attorney's testimony that his
work was not hampered by this loyalty to the victim. Id. at 45-46.
169 Langevoort, supra note 82, at 642.
17o See Langevoort, supra note 166, at 103 ("[O]nce commitment has occurred, and
especially if it is publicly expressed and repeated, what might be an obvious red flag ...
may not appear [as] such . . . .").
1' See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 261.
172 See id.
1' Professor Kim has recently written on this issue. See generally Sung Hui Kim,
Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REv. 129,
148-49 (2011) (suggesting lawyers internalize their clients' goals because they act as their
clients' "voice-box"). Professor Kim also relies on sociological data to suggest that lawyers
even internalize the antiregulatory biases of their clients. See id. at 150-52.
174 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 271.
'7 See Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 36
(2003).
176 See Eldred, supra note 92, at 66 (stating people have a "self as moral" bias, which
makes people believe they are "more objective than their average peer").
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The degree to which Sullivan perceived the interests of Barclays and Lehman
as intertwined is further illustrated by Sullivan's actions immediately after Lehman
filed for bankruptcy. Sullivan ceased to represent Lehman and began to represent
Barclays in its efforts to acquire Lehman's North American investment banking
and brokerage business.' 77 As noted above, one Sullivan lawyer described this
experience of transitioning from the representation of Lehman to the representation
of Barclays as "switching from shirts to skins." 178 But according to Cohen,
Lehman management had consented to Sullivan representing Barclays, and "[t]hey
were pleased because they knew we could help expedite the deal and it was very
important to get that deal done."
Under the Model Rules, an attorney is permitted to represent a client against a
former client, even if the lawyer performed work for the former client in the same
matter, provided that the former client provides informed consent. 80 Consequently,
assuming such consent was obtained-and Cohen has stated that it was-it was
not necessarily improper for Sullivan to represent Barclays against Lehman after
having previously represented Lehman against Barclays.'18 In Sullivan's view, the
representation likely served the best interests of both clients because they both
stood to benefit if Barclays were to acquire some of Lehman's businesses and keep
them operating.18 2
The problem with this view is that Lehman (and its creditors) may have fared
better if its attorneys viewed the interests of Lehman and Barclays as conflicting.
As noted, Barclays may have had incentives to overestimate its ability to acquire
Lehman prior to the bankruptcy so as to better position itself to acquire Lehman's
most valuable assets in the bankruptcy proceeding, and Barclays did ultimately
acquire Lehman's lucrative North American investment banking and brokerage
business as part of the proceeding.' 83 Lehman's creditors were so outraged by the
low price that Barclays paid 84 that they, along with the trustee for the Lehman
estate, sought to reverse the sale, alleging that Barclays obtained a substantial
windfall by buying Lehman assets at a deep discount from their fair value.8 5
17 See Byrne, supra note 11; Centers, supra note 4.
178 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 379.
179 Centers, supra note 4.
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2009).
18' One issue that Sullivan may not have considered is whether it obtained informed
consent from the correct individuals. There is.case law that suggests that Sullivan should
have sought the consent of the bankruptcy trustee to proceed with the representation and
not Lehman management. See In re Allboro Waterproofing Corp., 224 B.R. 286, 292-93
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding only the trustee of a bankrupt corporation can give
consent to attorney to represent divergent interests in same matter); In re Jaegar, 213 B.R.
578, 591 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) ("The duty of loyalty that an attorney owes to a former
client in substantially related matters extends to the chapter 7 trustee of a corporation.").
i8 Byrne, supra note 11.
183 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 455.
184 See White & Dash, supra note 153 (noting Lehman sold at a "fire-sale price").
185 See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 445 B.R. 143, 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Although the bankruptcy court refused to reverse the sale, it acknowledged
that the sale to Barclays was "hastily-arranged," and it agreed with the creditors
and the Lehman trustee that there had been serious lapses in disclosure.'86 The
court also found that Barclays had been in a "uniquely advantageous position
relative to any other institution that might be interested in competing for the
Lehman franchise" because of its pre-petition negotiations with Lehman. 187
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that the terms of the sale were fair
when considered in the context of the unprecedented market turmoil caused by the
Lehman bankruptcy. 1 The fact that Barclays' attorneys had been Lehman's
attorneys was not discussed in the opinion.
Sullivan may have believed that its representation of Lehman would be
unaffected by its close relationship with Barclays. The firm may have also believed
that it acted in the best interests of Lehman by helping to conclude the sale of some
of its businesses to Barclays after the bankruptcy. 189 Lehman and Barclays'
interests, however, were not aligned prior to bankruptcy, and if Lehman's creditors
and the bankruptcy trustee are to be believed, the law firm may have ultimately
assisted Barclays in obtaining a windfall when it purchased Lehman's North
American brokerage and investment banking business. That transactional lawyers
can often effectively represent one client against another client is reflected in ethics
opinions,190 but, as Sullivan's representation of Lehman in negotiations with
Barclays underscores, lawyers may not be able to easily set aside their
commitments to one client in the service of another.
C. Reputation with Regulators
Thus far, this Article has considered whether Sullivan's relationships with
other clients may have impacted the representation that it was able to provide to
Lehman. This section considers whether Sullivan's interest in preserving its own
reputation with government regulators gave rise to a conflict of interest that led it
to represent Lehman with less zealousness than niay have been necessary to avert a
Lehman bankruptcy.
A concurrent conflict of interest exists under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) if "there is
a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially
limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer."19' The comment to the Rule does
not define "personal interest" but suggests that attorneys may have a personal
8' See id. at 205.
117 Id. at 154.
" Id. at 154-55 (noting the transaction-if approved-would "save a multitude of
financial sector jobs" in the volatile Wall Street job market).
189 See Byme, supra note 11.
190 See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1, 2006 WL 1662501, at *6 (2006); Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York Comm. on Prof I & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-2, 2001 WL 1870202,
at *3 (2001).
191 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2009).
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interest that gives rise to a conflict of interest if they are seeking employment with
their clients' adversary or with the law firm representing the adversary.192 A
concurrent conflict of interest exists under these circumstances because there is a
danger that the attorney's interest may have an adverse effect on the attorney's
loyalty to the client.19 3
Although Cohen was under consideration for the position of Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury in 2009,194 there is no evidence to suggest that he was seeking a
government position during the time that he represented Lehman. Nevertheless,
Sullivan as a firm arguably had a "personal interest" in maintaining its strong
reputation with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve so that leading financial
institutions would continue to seek the firm's services in working with these and
other government agencies.195 If Sullivan's interest in preserving its reputation
"materially limited" the representation of Lehman, then the representation was
conflicted pursuant to Rule 1.7(a)(2), and Sullivan should have sought the
informed consent of Lehman to proceed with the representation.19 6
To be sure, all attorneys have an interest in maintaining positive relationships
with individuals and agencies with whom they interact on their clients' behalf. If
attorneys engage in "Rambo-style" tactics' in the service of their clients, they
will have difficulty working with the same individuals and entities in the future,
regardless of whether the attorneys can expect to be sanctioned. For this reason, as
Professor Zacharias has observed, even if ethics rules did not prohibit lawyers
from lying in the course of representing their clients, most attorneys would shy
192 Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 10.
193 See id.
194 See Michael M. Phillips, Cohen Drops Bid for Treasury, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12,
2009 5:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123689377819011905.html.
195 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1995)
(suggesting if a lawyer has substantial experience with a government agency, alienating the
agency could result in loss in value of attorney's investment in his relationship with the
agency); see also Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof'1 Guidance Comm. Phila. Ethics Op. 88-11
(1988), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion88-11 ?appNum=2
(suggesting attorney has concurrent conflict of interest where he received referrals from his
client's adversary).
196 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2); id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
197 "Rambo litigation" is characterized by "deception, nastiness, intimidation and
general lack of civility among lawyers." Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-
Minded Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in the Courts, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 81, 81 (1991);
see also Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 561, 562 (1996) ("In law offices across the country, the
John Rambos of the legal world are invading deposition rooms, yelling obscenities at
opposing counsel, and attempting to mow down their 'enemies' with nasty verbal
invectives. Unlike the silver screen stars, the John Rambos of the legal world are not heroes.
Instead, they are ruining the practice of law for those engaged in the legitimate process of
civil discovery.").
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away from such behavior.198 Attorneys who seek to preserve their good reputations
among regulators and members of the legal profession will not, in the vast majority
of cases, be materially limited in representing their clients and will not therefore
have a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2).199 To the contrary, lawyers'
willingness to temper their zeal may be crucial to the advancement of a client's
matter.200
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that an attorney's interest in preserving
his reputation becomes so strong that he is unable to represent his client effectively.
For example, Professor Freedman has in in the past criticized the Securities Bar for
failing to zealously represent clients to ingratiate itself with the Securities and
Exchange Commission:
What ha turned the Securities Bar from the attorneys' traditional role of
champions of their clients into wholly owned subsidiaries [of] the
enforcement conglomerate? . . [I]ncentives [from the Commission]
include rewards as well as punishments.
The rewards consist of favored treatment to some lawyers in their
appearances before the Commission. . . . The punishments are directed
toward intimidating attorneys into foregoing zealous advocacy on behalf
of their clients.2 0'
More recently, Professors Macey and Miller have suggested that this
phenomenon is not confined to discrete segments of the organized bar but
potentially all lawyers who represent clients before government agencies. They
write:
[T]he importance to clients of hiring lawyers with expertise and a proven
track record in representing clients before particular regulatory agencies
creates a situation in which lawyers representing clients before agencies
easily are "captured" by the agencies before whom they practice. In
particular, because private-sector lawyers are often "repeat players" in
their actions before governmental regulators, they have strong incentives
not to alienate the bureaucrats. . . . Repeat player representation by law
firms can lead to less than zealous representation because lawyers
balance the immediate interests of their clients against the long-term
interests of their firms in maintaining a cordial relationship with a
202particular bureaucrat or bureaucracy.
198 Zacharias, Effects of Reputation, supra note 5, at 202.
199 There appear to be no recorded cases of attorneys sanctioned for being concemed
with their reputations at the expense of their clients' interests.
200 See Zacharias, Effects of Reputation, supra note 5, at 179.
201 Monroe Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 280, 285 (1974) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202 Macey & Miller, supra note 195, at 1106.
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That clients are entitled to zealous representation is a fundamental tenet of the
American legal profession,2 03 although the degree to which attorneys should
zealously advocate for their clients is obviously a subject of intense dispute among
ethics scholars.204 But if Professors Macey and Miller are correct, attorneys and
firms who are repeat players like Cohen and Sullivan may be unwilling to fully
press their clients' interests because they cannot risk alienating government
regulators. 205
There is no doubt that Cohen had a particularly strong relationship with the
Federal Reserve and other banking regulators at the time Sullivan represented
Lehman. According to Sorkin, "Geithner often relied upon [Cohen] to understand
the Federal Reserve's own powers." 2 06 Such was Cohen's relationship with the
Federal Reserve that after Bear's stock price dropped precipitously on March 12,
2008, due to concerns about its investments in mortgage-backed securities, Cohen,
who had just begun representing Bear that day, was able to reach Geithner at
10:45 PM to urge the Federal Reserve to lend money directly to Bear.207
Cohen's level of access to Geithner and other government officials was
probably one of the main reasons that Bear, Lehman, and so many other financial
institutions sought Cohen's counsel during the financial crisis. 2 0 8 But to maintain
his and Sullivan's reputation with governmental regulators and to continue to
enjoy preferential access to them, Cohen may have been disinclined to directly
confront the Federal Reserve and the Treasury on Lehman's behalf, even as a
Lehman bankruptcy became increasingly likely.
This was not a concern for Lehman's bankruptcy attorneys at Weil, Gotshal,
& Manges, LLP (Weil). 2 0 9 When Tom Baxter, the general counsel for the New
203 The words "zealous" and "zealously" appear eight times in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
(1980) ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law."). The notion that lawyers should zealously
advocate for their clients is also reflected in the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) ("A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
204 Compare Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying
to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771,
772 (2005) (arguing zealous representation of the client can even require the attorney to
violate other disciplinary rules), with DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 58 (1988)
(criticizing the "adversary system excuse" when it causes lawyers to violate the dictates of
morality).
205 This may particularly be the case for lawyers like Cohen with highly specialized
areas of practice. See Macey & Miller, supra note 195, at 1110.
206 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 193.
207 See Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched OffFatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J.
(May 28, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121193290927324603.html.
208 See supra note 30.
209 Weil is a New York-based international law firm with offices located in Beijing,
London, and other cities. See Offices, WElL, http://www.weil.com/locations/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2012).
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York Federal Reserve, informed Weil partner Harvey Miller that Lehman had to
immediately file for bankruptcy, the two lawyers had the following exchange:
"Tom," Miller persisted, "This makes no sense. Yesterday, no one from
the Fed was talking to us about bankruptcy and now we have to have a
filing ready before midnight? And what is the magic of midnight? The
only way we could ever file, and it won't be by midnight, is with a
skinny Chapter 11 petition. What will that accomplish?"
"Well, we have our program," Baxter repeated.
Miller stood up, his six-foot-two frame looming over the other lawyers.
"What," he slowly bellowed, "is this program?"
Baxter just stared uneasily, offering no immediate answer.
"If Lehman goes into bankruptcy, totally unprepared, there's going to be
Armageddon," Miller warned. "I've been a trustee of broker-dealers,
little cases, and the effect of their bankruptcies on the market was
significant. Here, you want to take one of the largest financial
companies, one of the biggest insurers of commercial paper, and put it in
bankruptcy in a situation where this has never happened before. What
you're going to do is take liquidity out of the market. The markets are
going to collapse." Miller waved his finger, and repeated, "This will be
Armageddon." 2 10
Although Miller was unable to convince the government that Lehman should
not file for bankruptcy, even after further heated exchanges,2 11 his protestations led
the Federal Reserve to loan money to Lehman's broker-dealer business and to
allow the unit to delay its bankruptcy filing. 2 12 Miller's advocacy ensured that
Lehman's broker-dealer business would continue to operate, which was vital to
preserving the unit's value until a buyer could be found.2 13 Despite the gravity of
Lehman's situation and the fact that the government had already decided on a
course of action, Miller pressed Lehman's case in an aggressive manner that could
have alienated officials at the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. It is conceivable
that a more deferential approach would have achieved the same result; however, as
a bankruptcy attorney whose business was not dependent on a good relationship
21o SORKIN, supra note 4, at 357-58.
211 See id. at 359 (noting Miller's mocking of the Federal Reserve's plan to mollify
the market with press releases).
212 See id. at 11-17.
213 See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Statement on Proposed Lehman Bros.




with either the Treasury or the Federal Reserve, Miller was free to advocate for
Lehman in whatever manner he thought could best achieve Lehman's objectives.
Conversely, Cohen's representation of banking clients depends in large part
on strong relationships with the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and other government
regulators. Cohen had to be mindful of these important and lucrative connections
and would have been disinclined to directly confront banking regulators to protect
these connections.
For example, Cohen believed that no deal could be completed for Lehman
without government assistance 2 14 -a view that was shared by Geithner215 and
many outside observers. 2 16 Bank of America and Barclays had also informed
regulators that they would not purchase Lehman without financial assistance from
the government.2 17 However, there seemed to be no organized effort by Cohen and
Sullivan to pressure the government to reverse its position on providing monetary
assistance to Lehman in order to facilitate a sale.
According to Secretary Paulson, the Federal Reserve did not have the
authority to inject capital into Lehman, and Lehman's assets were insufficient to
support a loan large enough to avoid Lehman's collapse. 2 18 But many observers
discount this explanation and believe that political considerations explain why
Lehman was allowed to fail while other banks, including Sullivan client Bear,219
were not. 22 0 Secretary Paulson was determined to not be "Mr. Bailout" 22 1 after
political figures and the public-at-large had sharply criticized the Treasury and the
214 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 295.
215 Id.
216 See Matthew Goldstein, Lehman Endgame Looks Ugly, Bus. WEEK (Sept. 12,
2008), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/lehman
endgame looks ugly.html ("Without that kind of government-backed guarantee, it's by no
means certain any bank will be willing.to take on the risk of adding Lehman's questionable
commercial real estate assets to its balance sheet."); see also id. ("There's very little chance
anyone will do a deal for Lehman without the government stepping in.").
217 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 283 (noting Barclays was seeking government money
to purchase Lehman); PAULSON, supra note 24, at 184-86 (noting Bank of America would
not purchase Lehman without governmental or private help).
218 See Examiner's Report, supra note 12, at 11- 12.
219 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 11; Centers, supra note 4.
220 See, e.g., Michael Lewis & David Einhom, Op-Ed., The End of the Financial
World As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9 (New York ed.) available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/04lewiseinhom.html?pagewanted-all/
(noting inconsistency in the government's strategy by providing a bailout for Bear while
allowing Lehman to fail); SORKIN, supra note 4, at 536 (same); cf PAULSON, supra note 24,
at 225 (claiming that "I ought to have been more careful with my words" when mentioning
moral hazard in the context of the Lehman bankruptcy).
221 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 282.
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Federal Reserve for extending a $29 billion loan to Bear, backed by the company's
questionable mortgage assets.222
The government may have been unwilling to fund a solution for Lehman no
matter the actions of Lehman's attorneys. As Lehman's counsel, however, Sullivan
was not required to go along with Secretary Paulson's determination that he not
serve as "Mr. Bailout."223 Sullivan could have, for example, turned to Secretary
Paulson's superiors to emphasize the dangers that a Lehman bankruptcy would
bring. In this regard, it is noteworthy that George H. Walker IV-the former
President's second cousin-was head of Lehman's investment management unit.224
At the urging of a subordinate and apparently without speaking to Sullivan, Mr.
Walker sought to contact the White House after the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury had decided that Lehman should file for bankruptcy.2 25 By this time,
however, it was much too late to save the company.226
The decision to circumvent Secretary Paulson would not only have made
strategic sense, but it also could have been justified given Secretary Paulson's own
conflict of interest as the former CEO of Goldman, one of Lehman's primary
227competitors. Although Secretary Paulson surely did not wish to see Lehman fail,
his employment at Goldman afforded him a dim view of Lehman. According to his
account of the financial crisis:
I was frankly skeptical about [Lehman's] business mix and its ability to
attract a buyer or strategic investor. . . . Founded in 1850, Lehman had a
venerable name but a rocky recent history. Dissension had torn it apart
before it was sold to American Express in 1984. A decade later, it was
spun off in an initial public offering. Dick Fuld, as CEO, had done a
remarkable job of rebuilding it. But in many ways, Lehman was really
only a 14-year-old firm, with Dick as its founder. I liked Dick Fuld .
but like many "founders," his ego was entwined with the firm's. 2 28
222 See PAULSON, supra note 24, at 117, 120 (acknowledging action to save Bear
Steams was "hugely controversial" and was "bad precedent"); see also SORKIN, supra note
4, at 282, 302 (noting backlash to the Bear bailout).
223 SORKIN, supra note 4, at 282.
224 Id. at 361.
225 See id. at 362. Another potentially useful contact was Jeb Bush, the former
governor of Florida, who served as an advisor to Lehman's private equity business. See id.
at 284.
226 See id. at 362.
227 Secretary Paulson has been sharply criticized for maintaining close ties with his
former colleagues at Goldman at the expense of employees of other investment firms. See
Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta Jr., Paulson's Calls to Goldman Tested Ethics,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/
09paulson.htmlpagewanted=all/.
228 PAULSON, supra note 24, at 123; see also Evan Thomas, Paulson 's Complaint,
NEWSWEEK (May 15, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2009/05/15/paulson-s-
complaint.html ("The Lords of Goldman, who tend to come from Ivy League schools,
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Because of his background at Goldman, Secretary Paulson may have also
perceived Lehman as less integral to the economy than it actually was 229 and may
have been less willing than other members of the Bush administration to consider
financing Lehman. Indeed, much of Secretary Paulson's attention-even as
Lehman appeared to be headed for bankruptcy-was focused on finalizing a
merger between Merrill and Bank of America. 2 30 Nevertheless, Sullivan did not
appear to question whether Lehman was well served by dealing directly with
Secretary Paulson.
Even after British regulators signaled that they could not approve the
Barclays' purchase of Lehman unless the U.S. government was willing to help
231limit Barclays' potential exposure, there was no concerted effort on the part of
Sullivan to secure government assistance for the transaction. When informed by
Secretary Paulson that the FSA had refused to approve the sale of Lehman to
Barclays, Cohen's reaction was to pressure the FSA to change its view, as opposed
to exhorting Secretary Paulson to provide immediate monetary assistance so that
the company would have additional time to either complete a deal with Barclays or
to find another acquirer. 23 2
It is possible that Sullivan exerted pressure on U.S. government officials in
private and that its efforts in this regard have not been reported. Moreover, if
Lehman were to somehow survive, the strategy of working with regulators could
prove in the long-term interest of the company. But if Sullivan truly believed that a
sale of Lehman could not be completed without government assistance, 233 the
strategy of working almost entirely on a private sector solution for Lehman-even
as the deal with Barclays collapsed and bankruptcy was imminent-was highly
suspect.
However, to press for financial assistance for Lehman would have posed a
threat to Sullivan's relationships with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
Regulators tend to value "lawyers . . . who take reasonable positions, screen their
clients' desires, and incorporate the decision makers' needs."234 In particular,
seeking to circumvent Secretary Paulson or make an issue of his conflict of interest
looked down on the hustlers at lower-ranked firms like Lehman, who came out of state
schools and the trading pits.").
229 See Thomas, supra note 228.
230 See id.
231 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 348; see also id. at 345 (indicating the British
government was seeking to have someone guarantee Lehman's trades until the transaction
with Barclays could be completed); James Quinn, Hank Paulson Blames FSA for Lehman
Failure, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2010, 10:11 PM), http.//www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
globalbusiness/7111156/Hank-Paulson-blames-FSA-for-Lehman-failure.html.
232 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 349-50. Given that Sullivan's business is
predominantly focused on the United States, Cohen may have felt more comfortable
challenging British regulators than American ones.
233 See id. at 295.
234 See Zacharias, Effects ofReputation, supra note 5, at 191.
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as the former CEO of Goldman would have almost certainly resulted in Sullivan
losing the access that it previously enjoyed to Treasury and Federal Reserve
officials. Having brokered the unpopular Bear bailout, Sullivan may have also
been wary to demand that financial regulators now act to save Lehman.
To the extent that the decision to generally defer to government regulators
was made in tandem with Lehman, Sullivan's interest in preserving its reputation
among government regulators may not have had an adverse impact on the
representation that Lehman received. Indeed, Sullivan could have reasonably
advised, and Lehman may have believed, that the company's best chance of
survival was to comply with all of the government's demands. Nevertheless, since
it was in Sullivan's self-interest to protect its reputation with the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve, it is fair to ask whether Sullivan could objectively assess what
course of action would be best for Lehman. Sullivan's concern for the wishes of
government regulators was so strong that when Secretary Paulson ordered Cohen
to exclude Lehman CEO Richard Fuld from meetings at the Federal Reserve that
would decide Lehman's future, Cohen did as he was told.235
The decision to work cooperatively with regulators may have been prudent
when Sullivan's representation of Lehman began. But with the economy rapidly
deteriorating and it becoming increasingly certain that Lehman would need a
government bailout of some form to survive, Sullivan should have considered
whether Lehman would have been better served by attorneys who could challenge
recalcitrant regulators in the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to provide financial
assistance to facilitate Lehman's sale. The Model Rules in their current form
simply do not require that attorneys engage in this kind of critical self-analysis.
IV. LEHMAN AND LEGAL ETHICS
Thus far, this Article has sought to show that Sullivan's relationships with its
other clients and its concern for its reputation among government regulators
appears to have interfered with its representation of Lehman during the financial
crisis. The fact that Lehman was a sophisticated client and may have consented to
the conflicts of interest discussed in this Article in accordance with Rule 1.7 did
not ensure that its interests would be protected.
A natural reaction to this Article's case study of the representation that
Lehman received is to question whether it is truly worrisome that Lehman did not
receive ideal representation. Lehman knowingly chose to be represented by a law
firm that represents numerous banking clients, and it should have known that
Sullivan would have duties and responsibilities to Merrill and other banks that
could impact the representation that it received. Similarly, assuming Lehman knew
that Barclays was a Sullivan client, it should have surmised that Sullivan would
not be as rigorous in its due diligence as it would have been if it had no previous
relationship with Barclays. Lastly, if Lehman wanted attorneys who would be
235 See SORKIN, supra note 4, at 306.
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more aggressive and confrontational with regulators, it could have chosen to be
represented by.1awyers with reputations for these traits.
This Article's case study of Sullivan's representation of Lehman may simply
suggest that clients should not necessarily turn to the most well-connected lawyers
and law firms if they need to have their interests defended aggressively. Lehman
should have considered whether Sullivan could be expected to do everything
possible to avert a Lehman bankruptcy when the firm also had close relationships
with other banks and had a strong interest in preserving its reputation with
government regulators. Other firms may have had more flexibility to advance
Lehman's interests because they had not been involved in negotiating the
enormously unpopular rescue of Bear, for example. 2 36
Lehman's experience should also cast some doubt, however, on the practice
of allowing law firms to solicit prospective waivers of conflicts of interest. The
Model Rules contemplate that "experienced users of legal services" can provide
"general and open-ended consent" to future conflicts of interest, 237 and large law
firms like Sullivan view prospective waivers of client conflicts as "a routine
large firm practice." 23 8 Through these waivers, Lehman may have consented to
Sullivan's client conflicts with respect to Merrill and Barclays. Consequently,
Sullivan may not have disclosed that Merrill had contacted it to learn of the
progress of negotiations between Lehman and Bank of America and would not
have necessarily been required to do so under Rule 1.7. Similarly, while Lehman
was undoubtedly aware that Barclays was a long-time Sullivan client, Sullivan
would not have been required to inform Lehman of the extent of the relationship,
even after Barclays emerged as Lehman's most likely acquirer.
Although some commentators, and law firms themselves, have defended the
propriety of prospective waivers of conflict of interest for sophisticated clients,239
Professor Fox may well be correct when he suggests:
It does not matter how smart a client is, how experienced a client is, how
sophisticated a client is, how many lawyers a client has representing him
or her, for how many years he or she has hired lawyers, or how many
lawyers he or she has hired . . .. Clients do not know anything about this
236 This is not to say that Sullivan's competitors might not have had conflicts of their
own, but Sullivan's representation appeared to have been particularly conflicted because it
represented so many institutions during the financial crisis and because Mr. Cohen "has
been a counsel to just about every major player on Wall Street." Jennifer Parker, Third Top
Treasury Pick Withdraws from Consideration, ABC NEWS (March 12, 2009, 2:30 PM)
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/03/another-top-tre/. Indeed, Cohen allegedly
withdrew from consideration for a position with the Treasury Department because of the
extent of his relationships with the banks that he would have been regulating. See id.
237 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2009).
238 See DiLemia, supra note 98, at 98.
239 See id. at 126-27 (noting widespread acceptance of prospective waivers of
conflicts of interest among large-firm lawyers); Lerner, supra note 98, at 971-73; Wolfram,
supra note 60, at 44.
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prospective waiver except that they are informed that they are not
informed.240
Even if one believes that prospective waivers should be permitted in some
circumstances-such as to permit lawyers from different offices of a firm to work
on matters that are in conflict-there is a far greater risk that a lawyer's loyalty to
one client will compromise his ability to represent the other client effectively when
it is the same lawyer or group of lawyers working on both matters.24 1
The rationale for treating sophisticated clients differently under Rule 1.7 is
that sophisticated clients ostensibly do not need as much information as
unsophisticated clients do because they can monitor and supervise their attorneys
and dismiss them if they are not performing adequately because of conflicts of
interest. 242 However, unless it is assumed that sophisticated clients generally
micro-manage their attorneys, which would partly defeat the purpose of retaining
sophisticated law firms such as Sullivan, they may be unable to ascertain their
attorneys' precise conflicts of interest or monitor the conflicts' impact.243 Even if
sophisticated clients like Lehman were to inform themselves of all of their
attorneys' conflicts of interest, the clients may not be able to entirely "fend for
themselves" because no client can fully anticipate what a representation will
require, and a conflict of interest may not seem problematic until it is too late.244
The Model Rules disregard these realities by encouraging lawyers to think of
conflicts of interest in static terms: they exist before the lawyer accepts the
representation, arise after the representation has begun, or are entirely unforeseen,
and the lawyer is asked to assess the conflict's significance and make the
appropriate disclosures.245 But the significance of a conflict of interest can change
over the course of a representation. Sullivan's relationships with Merrill and
Barclays would have been of minimal relevance to Lehman when Sullivan began
the representation, and Lehman would have viewed Sullivan's relationships with
government regulators as an asset. These relationships became far more
240 Fox, supra note 98, at 716.
241 This point seems to be conceded even by some defenders of prospective waivers.
See Jones & Davis, supra note 5, at 594 ("[L]aw firms as institutions are capable of being
'loyal' to different clients through different lawyers and . . .. sophisticated clients are
capable of understanding that."); see also id. (suggesting. current conflict rules may be
effective for small firms but questioning their utility "in firms of hundreds of lawyers
representing clients in dozens of offices in multiple countries of the world").
242 See id. at 597; McMunigal, supra note 5, at 873.
243 See Fox, supra note 5, at 574 ("[W]hen ... law firms talk about sophisticated
clients they are talking about organizations, largely corporations, that are indeed often
extremely sophisticated, though even more often hopelessly naive. . . . [Their sophistication]
has little or nothing to do with our profession, our skill sets, [or] our rules of professional
conduct.").
244 Macey & Miller, supra note 195, at I111.
245 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 3-5 (2009).
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problematic for Lehman, however, as its list of potential acquirers grew shorter and
the company's prospects for survival diminished.
Of course, no professional responsibility rule can fully insulate clients from
attorney conflicts of interest. But Rule 1.7 may actually make it more likely that a
client will receive conflicted representation. By establishing a step-by-step process
for attorneys to follow to carry out a conflicted representation, Rule 1.7 encourages
lawyers to think of conflicts of interest as obstacles to be circumvented.24 6 Lawyers
can easily convince themselves that because they are following the Rule's minimal
steps, they are acting ethically and a conflict of interest will not be problematic.
The client's role is to consent to the conflict of interest that has been identified by
the attorney, which, as noted in Part II.B of this Article, the client will usually
provide. The lawyer will rarely receive pushback from the client even as the
lawyer's performance suffers because Rule 1.7 simply does not contemplate an
ongoing dialogue with the client concerning the conflict of interest and its impact
on the representation.
Lastly, Sullivan's representation of Lehman illustrates that there can be a
societal interest in the "vigorous development" of client positions outside of
litigation,247 and, to the extent that a sophisticated client fails to fully safeguard its
interests by closely monitoring its attorney's conflicts of interest, the consequences
can extend to society as a whole. The consensus view is that allowing Lehman to
enter into bankruptcy was "the mistake of a lifetime." 248 Lehman may have been
unable to avoid bankruptcy regardless, but it would have been better served if its
attorneys' ability to act in its interest was not undermined by client conflicts and
reputational interests.
The course of Sullivan's representation of Lehman during the financial crisis
should engender increased skepticism as to the desirability of conflicted
representation for even highly sophisticated clients. The next section draws on the
lessons of Sullivan's representation of Lehman to suggest specific modifications to
Rule 1.7.
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO RULE 1.7
Rule 1.7 purports to protect clients from their attorneys' concurrent conflicts
of interest by requiring attorneys to disclose their conflicts and for clients to
provide informed consent to these conflicts. Assuming that clients are willing to
consent to a particular conflict,' lawyers still cannot carry out the representation
246 Professors Baron and Greenstein have persuasively argued that the structure of
legal education encourages lawyers to think of ethical rules as "occasional potholes in the
road-danger areas that the conscientious and attentive lawyer should either avoid
altogether or navigate through carefully and safely." Jane B. Baron & Richard K.
Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 48 (2001).
247 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 17.
248 See The Price of Failure, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2008, at. 82, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/12342689.
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unless they believe that they can provide "competent and diligent
,249 250
representation,"4 and the Model Rules entirely prohibit some representations.
However, even if one assumes that lawyers honestly disclose their conflicts of
interest-despite it being against their financial interest to do so-clients routinely
waive them, 2 5 1 and the vast majority of lawyers will conclude that they can
competently and diligently represent their clients notwithstanding conflicts of
interest. Rule 1.7 does not mandate that attorneys consider whether their conflicts
of interest will frustrate the objectives of the representation, and the Rule may, in
fact, provide false assurance to lawyers that their conflicts of interest are not
problematic as long as they have disclosed their conflicts and their clients have
consented to them.
There are undoubtedly some conflicts of interest that are so minor in nature
that they will not affect the representation that a client will receive. For example, if
a client has a long-standing relationship with a large law firm, the client may want
the firm to represent him, even if some of the firm's lawyers represent the
adversary in a small, unrelated matter. The firm may well be able to provide
effective representation to both clients.252 Many conflicts of interest, however, will
be far more difficult to evaluate and could ultimately jeopardize the representation
that attorneys are able to provide, even if their clients are prepared to consent to the
conflicts.
Although sophisticated clients like Lehman can be expected to better assess
their attorneys' conflicts of interest, the widespread use of prospective waivers of
conflicts of interest by large law firms means that many of these firms' clients may
be unaware of their attorneys' specific conflicts; even if the clients make
themselves aware of these conflicts, they may have difficulties gauging their full
significance until it is too late. When Sullivan began representing Lehman,
Lehman certainly would not have anticipated that it and Merrill would both be
seeking to merge with Bank of America. Nor could Lehman have expected that
249 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
250 See id. R. 1.7(b)(3).
251 See supra Part II.B.
252 For a trenchant criticism of the presumption that an attorney should not represent
one client against another client when the two representations are unrelated, see Daniel J.
Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207 (2012). See also Jones & Davis, supra
note 5, at 592-93 (noting that the practice in England and many other countries is to allow
a lawyer to take a representation directly adverse to an existing client when the matters are
unrelated). In the United States, Texas alone follows the English rule. See id. at 593.
Although the merits of MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) are beyond the
scope of the Article, eliminating the Rule would not alleviate the attorney's obligation to
consider case-by-case whether his or her loyalty to a client is likely to "materially limit" his
or her ability to represent an individual or entity against that client pursuant to MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2). In addition, if one assumes that most clients
would seek to fire their lawyers if they litigate against them without consent, the only
circumstance that a lawyer would willingly sue a current client is when- the lawyer wishes
to drop that client for a higher-paying one. See Fox, supra note 5, at 577.
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Barclays would emerge as its only viable acquirer or that the government would
prefer for Lehman to file for bankruptcy rather than provide monetary assistance to
facilitate the investment bank's purchase.
Rule 1.7(b) should require attorneys to consider the extent to which their
conflicts of interest will have a negative effect on their clients' objectives as
opposed to attorneys' ability to provide "competent and diligent representation."253
In addition, the Rule should seek to ensure that clients receive sufficient
information during the course of a representation to revoke their consent to their
attorneys' conflicts of interest when these conflicts' circumstances change. In light
of the foregoing, Rule 1.7 should be modified as follows:
Model Rule 1.7
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
cmpetent and diligent representation to each affected client the conflict
of interest will not frustrate the lawyer's ability to meet the client's
objectives in the representation2 54;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Model Rule 1.7 Comment
[21] The lawyer shall regularly consult with the client as to the
conflict of interest's effect on the representation. A client who has
given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other
client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether
revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer
from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances,
including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent
because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable
expectations of the other client, and whether material detriment to the
other clients or the lawyer would result.
Although it is impossible to know whether Sullivan and Lehman would have
acted differently if Rule 1.7(b) as modified above had governed their relationship,
253 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
254 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. c(i)
(2000) (defining what constitutes an "adverse effect" on a representation in the context of a
lawyer's duty to preserve client confidences).
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the modified Rule would have at least required Sullivan to consider whether its
conflicts of interest would have a bearing on Lehman's efforts to avoid bankruptcy.
For example, Cohen's refusal to disclose that Merrill was seeking to merge with
Bank of America certainly jeopardized Lehman's ability to conclude a merger with
Bank of America.2 55 Once confronted with this conflict, Sullivan should have
considered withdrawing from the representation, even if Lehman had previously
waived any Merrill-related conflicts. 25 6 Similarly, once Sullivan determined that
finding a merger partner for Lehman would not be possible without monetary
assistance from banking regulators, and regulators were unwilling to provide such
assistance, Sullivan should have been forced to consider whether it could risk its
relationships with regulators in order to pursue much-needed financial backing for
Lehman.
Equally important, the requirement that lawyers regularly consult with their
clients as to a conflict of interest's effect on a representation allows the client to
reassess conflicts with which it previously may have been unconcerned. When
Sullivan's representation of Lehman began, for example, there were many
potential Lehman acquirers.2 57 Assuming that Sullivan solicited and received a
prospective waiver of its client conflicts from Lehman, Sullivan and Lehman
would not have necessarily been required to reassess the Barclays conflict when
Barclays emerged as one of the only interested merger partners. 25 8 Modifying the
rule to require regular consultation empowers clients to retract their consent to
conflicts that they did not foresee or did not fully appreciate at the outset of the
representation. 259 Consequently, to the extent that Sullivan and Lehman did not
discuss whether Sullivan's relationship with Barclays would affect its ability to
negotiate effectively for Lehman, they would have been required to do so under the
modified Rule 1.7.
CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that attorney conflicts of interest can impact the
representation that even sophisticated clients like Lehman receive. Although
Sullivan undoubtedly attempted to represent Lehman to the best of its ability and
may have not violated any disciplinary rules in representing Lehman, Sullivan's
ability to act in the best interests of Lehman and achieve the bank's objectives was
255 See supra Part III.A.
256 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (noting a lawyer must
withdraw if a conflict is nonconsentable).
257 See supra Part 1.
258 This is because Lehman is a sophisticated client that would have been represented
by in-house counsel in signing any prospective waiver. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm.
Op. 309 (2001) ("An advance waiver given by a client having independent counsel (in-
house or outside) available to review such actions presumptively is valid . . . even if
general in character."); see supra Part III.A.
259 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 309 (suggesting it is "prudent" for a lawyer
to revisit a conflict when a conflict actually arises").
943
UTAH LAW REVIEW
frustrated by its close relationships with Merrill and Barclays, as well as its desire
to maintain its strong reputation among Treasury and Federal Reserve officials.
The history of Sullivan's representation of Lehman during the financial crisis
illustrates that technical compliance with conflict of interest rules does not ensure
that a client's interests will be protected, regardless of the sophistication of the
client and the lawyers providing the representation.
Rule 1.7 can be improved by requiring attorneys to regularly consult with
their clients concerning the effect that their conflicts of interest are having on the
representation. To the extent that a lawyer feels that a conflict of interest is
compromising his ability to achieve the objectives of the representation, he should
seek to withdraw, even if the lawyer reasonably believes that he can provide
"competent and diligent representation." 2 6 0 There is little value in allowing a
lawyer to carry out a conflicted representation when the client either receives little
information concerning the lawyer's conflict or when the lawyer's ability to satisfy
the client's objectives in the representation is frustrated by the conflict.
Perhaps of even greater importance is that practicing attorneys take conflicts
of interest seriously and do not merely view them as obstacles to be circumvented.
There is a societal interest in clients receiving zealous representation even in
nonlitigation settings. Some conflicts of interest will not encumber a representation,
and the client's choice of counsel should be respected. In cases where a lawyer's
loyalties are consciously or unconsciously divided, however, a conflict of interest
is an affirmative reason that the attorney should decline or terminate the
representation. Sullivan's loyalty to Merrill, its credulity of Barclays' motives, and
its inability to aggressively challenge the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to fund
a solution for Lehman interfered with the representation that Lehman was able to
receive. In light of these conflicts, Lehman may have been better served if another
firm represented it-a firm that was able to always act in Lehman's best interests.
That attorneys will often have conflicts of interest in representing clients may
be a consequence of the increasing complexity of modern legal practice. This
Article focused on Sullivan's representation of Lehman, but conflicted
representation was a characteristic of much of the legal work carried out in
connection with the financial crisis, including the controversial government rescue
of American Insurance Group (AIG). As articulated in the Final Report of the
Congressional Oversight Committee on the TARP:
The AIG rescue illustrated the tangled nature of relationships on Wall
S.treet. People from the same small group of law firms, investment banks,
and regulators appear in the AIG saga (and many other aspects of the
financial crisis) in many roles, and sometimes representing different and
conflicting interests. The lawyers who represented banks trying to put
together a rescue package for AIG became the lawyers to [the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York], shifting sides in a matter of minutes. . ..
The need to address conflicts and the appearance of conflicts by
26o MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
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government actors, counterparties, lawyers, and all other agents involved
in this drama was wrongly treated largely as a detail that could be
subjugated to the primary goal of keeping the financial system up and -
261running.
Clients of all levels of sophistication deserve to be represented by attorneys
who are entirely dedicated to protecting their clients' interests. Attorneys may fall
short of providing this type of representation, but this should not be because the
legal profession has become so certain of its ability to manage conflicts of interest
that it overlooks their potentially pernicious effects.
261 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
PANEL 141-42 (2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/
20110401232213/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-03161 1-report.pdf.
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